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Abstract: A correlational study examined the suppositions of Headey and Wearing’s four-
dimension model of subjective wellbeing (SWB) and psychological distress amongst people 
experiencing psychosis. The research objective was to replicate the model with the studied 
sample and to examine how emotional distress resulting from psychosis affects the individuals’ 
satisfaction with life and positive affect levels. Forty-seven individuals with a diagnosis of 
paranoid schizophrenia completed self-report measures of psychoticism, paranoid ideation, 
depression and anxiety (Brief Symptom Inventory), positive affect (Affect Balance Scale), and life 
satisfaction (Satisfaction With Life Scale). Correlational patterns of the four-dimension model 
were replicated with individuals experiencing psychosis. Although the levels of depression and 
anxiety were clearly elevated in comparison with general population norms, the levels of 
positive affect remained similar to those in the general population, and the average life 
satisfaction appeared only slightly decreased. Depression was found to act as a dominant 
mediator between the severity of experiences of psychosis and satisfaction with life. Possible 
explanations for the findings are proposed and implications from the positive clinical 
psychology perspective are suggested. Based on the study outcomes it is argued that: (1) 
psychosis does not equal unhappiness, (2) psychosis does not immobilize adaptive mechanisms 
of SWB, (3) psychosis does not exempt individuals from positive mood set-points, and (4) 
psychosis does not indiscriminately lower life satisfaction. 
 
Keywords: subjective wellbeing, happiness, satisfaction with life, positive affect, psychosis, 
paranoid schizophrenia, positive clinical psychology 
 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Cognition and affect in subjective wellbeing 
Subjective wellbeing (SWB) has often been used as a general definition and synonym of 
happiness (Noddings, 2003) with the implication that happiness is intrinsically about subjective 
and individual experience (Nettle, 2005). Hence, happiness can be perceived as a positive 
subjective state defined by the individual who believes that his/her life and current events are 
going well (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008). 
Empirical studies on SWB have consistently suggested that it consists of at least two 
integral aspects: affect, which represents the emotional experience of joy, and cognition, which 
represents evaluation of satisfaction with life (Carr, 2004). Nettle (2005) proposed that SWB 
Subjective wellbeing in psychosis 
Mankiewicz, Gresswell, & Turner 
 
www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 36 
might be understood on three mutually interacting levels: level 1 consists of momentary 
feelings, such as joy and pleasure, level 2 involves judgements about feelings and life 
(individual life satisfaction), and level 3 consists of general subjective quality of life and 
flourishing. Joy is the most immediate and direct sense of happiness and is brought on by a 
desired state being attained; little cognition is involved in this state beyond the recognition that 
the desired event has occurred (Nettle, 2005). 
SWB, however, is not identical to short-term sensory pleasure, to which individuals quickly 
habituate (Peterson & Park, 2009). Hence, when people say they are happy, it does not mean 
that they are literally joyful all the time (Nettle, 2005). The process of overall self-appraisal of 
life is involved, and the degree to which individuals judge the perceived quality of their lives 
favourably results in different levels of life satisfaction (Veenhoven, 1991). This process may 
occur implicitly or explicitly (Andrews & Withey, 1974). Diener and Lucas (2000) explained that 
life satisfaction is the function of a person’s evaluation of how they are doing in their lives 
generally, especially in the domains that are important to them. Each individual evaluates 
his/her life differently depending on their expectations, hierarchy of values, and previous 
experiences. It therefore follows that research on SWB needs to incorporate idiosyncratic 
assessments of individuals’ thoughts and feelings about their lives (Diener & Lucas, 2000), and 
that in measures of life satisfaction the exact standards for happiness should be left up to the 
individual. Despite this idiosyncratic approach, self-reports of happiness appear highly reliable 
and agree significantly with observers’ ratings, diary methods and behavioural measures 
(Peterson & Park, 2009). 
However, judgements of life satisfaction are not merely a function of how individuals 
appraise their lives, but also of how they feel at the time of judgemental processes (Veenhoven, 
1991). Schwarz and Strack (1991) argued that since moods increase the accessibility of mood-
congruent information in memory, then if positive affect dominates at the time of the 
judgement, the selective retrieval of positive cognitions would result in an upbeat evaluation of 
one’s life satisfaction. It follows that satisfaction with life appears partially dependent on an 
individual’s emotional state (Lewinsohn, Redner, & Seeley, 1991). 
In general, positive psychology researchers (e.g. Diener & Lucas, 2000; Argyle, 2001) seem 
to support the assumption that positive emotions are not merely the polar opposites of negative 
ones but that these two dimensions are at least partially independent and coexist with each 
other. Also, neurophysiological evidence indicating that the brain centres registering positive 
affect and negative affect are separate appears to support this assumption (Kahneman, 1999). It 
has been demonstrated that in frontal zones a differential lateralisation for positive and 
negative emotions exists, with relative left-hemispheric activation for positive emotions and 
relative right-hemispheric activation for negative emotions (Ahern & Schwartz, 1985; Alves, 
Fukusima, & Aznar-Casanova, 2008; Natale, Gur, & Gur, 1983). These structures, however, 
have been shown to work together to process and generate emotional information and 
emotional behaviour (Huppert, 2005). Furthermore, Posner, Russell and Peterson (2005) 
demonstrated that although the existence of relative lateralisation for positive and negative 
emotions has been supported by empirical research, a strictly dimensional neuroanatomical 
continuum does not exist, as all affective states arise from coexisting and overlapping 
neurophysiological systems. 
 
1.2 Four-dimension model of SWB and psychological distress 
Headey and Wearing (1991) provided evidence that some psychological distress can occur 
alongside moderately high general levels of happiness. Therefore, in their model SWB was 
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assumed to consist of at least three dimensions: positive affect, life satisfaction and negative 
affect. In a subsequent publication, Headey and Wearing (1992) argued that negative affect 
should be subdivided further, as the authors demonstrated that depression and anxiety, the 
two main forms of psychological distress, were at least partly independent and both influenced 
SWB levels. The authors reported that measures of depression and anxiety were only 
moderately correlated, and that while individuals could be satisfied with their lives and 
anxious, it was rare to find people who were satisfied and depressed. Both depression and 
anxiety were shown to be significant indicators of SWB through their inverse effect on a sense 
of satisfaction, and on frequency of positive affect. 
Given their findings, Headey and Wearing (1992) proposed a four-dimension model of 
SWB and psychological distress. The four reciprocally interacting factors were: life satisfaction, 
positive affect, depression, and anxiety. Based on data collected from their Australian general 
population study, the authors established observed correlations between the four dimensions, 
as presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Observed correlations between four dimensions of SWB and psychological distress 
 
Note: Reproduced with permission from ‚Understanding Happiness‛ by B. 
Headey and A. Wearing (1992), p. 33. 
 
1.3 Neglect of SWB in traditional clinical psychology 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) argued that an exclusive focus on pathology has for a 
long time dominated the psychological discipline and has resulted in a negativistic model of 
human beings that lacks the positive features that make life worth living, and in a distorted 
view of normal human experience. The neglect of SWB within the field of clinical psychology 
might be explained by the field’s long-established focus on people with severe psychological 
difficulties, which in practice often means tackling problems and reducing distress rather than 
promoting happiness (Conway & MacLeod, 2002). 
Thus, given that the historic endorsement of the disease paradigm of human functioning 
has led to a neglect of human strengths and virtues in clinical psychology, it appears important 
for clinicians working with individuals with complex, severe and enduring psychological 
difficulties, such as psychosis, to understand how happiness models apply to their clients in 
order to inform possible means to maximise their SWB. 
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1.4 Diagnostic descriptions of psychosis 
Although the medical construct of schizophrenia has been methodologically questioned for 
decades (e.g. Bentall, 1990; Boyle, 1993), psychosis continues to be typically described using a 
symptomatological approach. The characteristic symptoms of psychosis have been divided into 
two major clusters: positive and negative symptoms. Positive symptoms include hallucinations, 
delusions, thought disorder and cognitive processing abnormalities (Sass & Parnas, 2003). 
Negative symptoms refer to deficits in functioning and may include restricted emotional 
expression, impoverished speech, inattention, lack of motivation, apathy, poor concentration, 
social withdrawal, lowered activity levels, and avolition (Johns, Sellwood, McGovern, & 
Haddock, 2002). 
Diagnostic guidelines of the ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders 
(World Health Organisation, 1992) necessitate the presence of a minimum of one very clear 
positive symptom (such as delusions of control or hallucinatory voices) for most of the time 
during a period of one month or more, as the prime requirement for a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. Additionally, paranoid delusions of persecution and/or prominent threatening 
or commanding hallucinations must be present in order to satisfy diagnostic criteria for 
paranoid schizophrenia.  
 
1.5 Emotional distress in psychosis 
Psychological distress has been acknowledged in most aetiological models of psychosis 
(Corcoran et al., 2003) and severe symptoms of depression and anxiety were found to be 
prevalent amongst people with diagnoses of schizophrenia (Marneros & Akiskal, 2007; 
Scheller-Gilkey, Thomas, Woolwine, & Miller, 2002). The prevalence of diagnostic comorbidity 
was found to be as high as 57.3%, of which approximately 62% of people were found to have 
some form of anxiety disorder (Good, 2002). Siris (1991) reviewed 29 studies investigating the 
incidence and prevalence of secondary depression in psychosis, and concluded that its 
occurrence amongst individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia ranged to as many as 70% of 
studied cases. In addition, his review highlighted that the personal wellbeing of persons with 
psychosis and depression was lower, they tended to experience more auditory hallucinations 
and suicidal ideations, they had lower self-esteem, and were more self-critical and hopeless. 
Evidence suggests that experiencing positive symptoms of psychosis, especially auditory 
hallucinations, as dominating, insulting and commanding correlates with higher levels of 
psychological distress (Vaughan & Fowler, 2004). Norman and Malla (1991) reported that high 
levels of depression and anxiety were associated with hallucinations and delusions but not 
with negative symptoms. Also, studies reviewed by Bentall (2003) suggested that positive 
symptoms of psychosis, such as paranoid ideations, were accompanied by emotional distress, 
such as dysphoria and anxiety. 
Cognitive models of psychosis suggest that depression and anxiety do not arise directly 
from positive symptoms of psychosis but rather from an individual’s interpretation of those 
symptoms and personal meanings attached to those experiences (Fowler, Garety, & Kuipers, 
1995). Hence, following the cognitive framework, the appraisal of unusual experiences appears 
to play the critical role in determining whether or not an individual arrives at a delusional 
interpretation of a hallucinatory experience (Steel, 2008). The cognitive content of emotions is 
hypothesised to be expressed in a symptom of psychosis, such as a delusional belief, which in 
turn directly contributes to the exacerbation of distress (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & 
Bebbington, 2002). Subsequently, anxiety will arise from the threat belief, while depression will 
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be associated with beliefs about the power of the persecutors, personal failure and deserved 
punishment (Freeman et al., 2002). 
Overall, the picture of emotional experiences in psychosis as so far portrayed in the clinical 
and research literature appears to be largely negative and pessimistic. This bias might 
contribute to a discouraging supposition that the levels of positive affect and life satisfaction 
amongst individuals with experiences of psychosis might be considerably lower in comparison 
to the general population. However, as argued by Linley, Joseph, Harrington and Wood (2006), 
positive psychologists need to redress what is perceived as an imbalance in the focus of clinical 
research in applied psychology. 
 
1.6 Positive psychology and psychosis – a non-existent relationship? 
Psychological deficits and disability have traditionally been the focus of clinical psychology, 
which has rarely focused on individuals’ resilience and resourcefulness. Even though examples 
of studies describing successfully implemented interventions and their positive impact on 
wellbeing of people with psychosis have been available in clinical literature (e.g. Bryson, 
Lysaker & Bell, 2002), Braehler and Harper (2008) still reported that quality of life of those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia remained low. 
Although Romme (1993) argued that intervention and rehabilitation for people with 
psychosis should focus on enhancing all fundamental qualities of their lives, the empirical 
studies of SWB in psychosis appear underrepresented in comparison with psycho-
pathologically oriented clinical research. Therefore, a need for a more positive approach to 
psychotic experiences was identified by Chadwick (1997), who argued that people diagnosed 
with schizophrenia have strengths as well as deficits, and that psychology has to focus on these 
capacities to increase dignity and life quality of people with psychosis. James (2001) suggested 
that overcoming a sense of powerlessness might be one of the factors contributing to the 
increase in SWB of people with psychosis. More recent and positive approaches to the 
education of mental health practitioners advocated for delivering a thorough training in 
combating discrimination towards individuals with psychosis, focusing on their human 
qualities and encouraging their hope (Houghton, Shaw, Hayward & West, 2006). 
The applied positive psychology movement has aimed to generate an empirical knowledge 
base focusing on human strengths which would complement the deficit-based traditional 
stance. Hence, from the perspective of positive clinical psychology, as proposed by Joseph and 
Linley (2006), the role of mental health practitioners is not only to alleviate distress and treat 
symptoms, but also to promote health, build strengths and facilitate SWB. Thus, it can be 
argued that as a part of the change advocated by positive clinical psychology, we need to 
establish whether individuals with severe psychological difficulties, such as psychosis, can 
experience happiness in the way that people from the general population do. Bergsma and 
Veenhoven (2011) have recently instigated an empirical investigation of happiness levels 
amongst individuals with various psychiatric diagnoses and argued that mental disorder was 
not the same as unhappiness. Unfortunately, their study did not incorporate participants with 
diagnosis of schizophrenia. To address the identified gap in the existing knowledge, the 
present study aimed to examine the applicability of the four-dimension model of SWB and 
psychological distress to people experiencing psychosis. 
 
1.7 The present study 
A correlational study was conducted to examine the suppositions of the four-dimension model 
amongst individuals diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and to investigate how emotional 
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distress resulting from psychosis affects the individual’s satisfaction with life and positive 
affect levels. Statistical analysis consisted of three subsequent stages. In stage 1, it was 
hypothesised that the correlational patterns proposed by the four-dimension model of SWB 
and psychological distress would be replicated with people experiencing psychosis 
(Hypothesis 1). In stage 2 of the analysis, based on the evidence derived from previous 
research in emotional distress in psychosis it was hypothesised that the self-reported severity 
of experiences of psychosis would be positively correlated with the anxiety and depression 
dimensions of the model (Hypothesis 2), and inversely correlated with the dimensions of 
positive affect and life satisfaction (Hypothesis 3). It was also predicted that the presence of 
psychosis would be accompanied by heightened levels of depression and anxiety in 
comparison to general population norms (Hypothesis 4), decreased levels of positive affect 
(Hypothesis 5), and consequently, reduced life satisfaction (Hypothesis 6). Finally, given the 
replicated correlational patterns of the four-dimension model, in stage 3, it was hypothesised 
that the effects that experiences of psychosis might have on individual life satisfaction would 
be mediated by the affective levels of depression, anxiety and positive affect (Hypothesis 7). 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
In our study, 47 participants with active experiences of psychosis were recruited from mental 
health specialist in-patient wards and outpatient clinics around the National Health Service’s 
Trusts in the East Midlands, UK. Participants were aged from 18 years to more than 60, had the 
capacity to give informed consent, and were diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. 
Of the 42 participants who provided demographic information, 31 were men and 11 were 
women. Thirty-nine were of White British, two of White Irish and one of Black British 
Caribbean origin. Twenty-nine participants were outpatients and 13 in-patients. Most 
participants were single, four were married and four divorced. Thirty-two participants were 
unemployed, three were in part-time and one in full-time employment, three were students, 
and two were homemakers and/or carers. 
 
2.2 Measures 
The severity of psychosis, depression and anxiety symptoms were operationalized through the 
self-reported levels of burden they caused to an individual, and were measured with the Brief 
Symptom Inventory (Derogatis, 1993). The self-reported levels of positive affect, defined as joy 
or enjoyment, were assessed with the Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn, 1969). Satisfaction with 
life, defined as a cognitive appraisal of an individual’s quality of life, was measured with the 
Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). 
 
2.2.1 Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) 
The BSI is a 53-item self-report inventory, which has been designed to reflect the psychological 
complaint patterns amongst mental health in-patients and community outpatients. Each BSI 
item is rated on a five-point scale (0-4) reflecting a person’s distress from ‚not at all‛ to 
‚extremely‛. The BSI is a measure of current psychological symptom status and is scored on 
nine primary symptom dimensions: somatisation, obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal 
sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, psychoticism, and paranoid ideation 
(Derogatis, 1993).  
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The BSI appears to have satisfactory psychometric properties. Normative samples for BSI 
included 1002 adult psychiatric outpatients, 974 adult non-patients, 423 adult psychiatric 
inpatients, and 2408 adolescent non-patients. Internal consistency was established using 
Cronbach alpha coefficients for all nine dimensions, which ranged from 0.71 to 0.85, while test-
retest reliability coefficients were estimated between 0.68 and 0.91 (Derogatis, 1993). Internal 
structure and construct validity was found to be sufficient: orthogonal varimax loadings 
determined from principal components analysis ranged from 0.35 to 0.71. Convergent and 
discriminant validity was examined through comparison with the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory; correlation coefficients scoped from 0.31 to 0.72 (Derogatis, 1993). The BSI 
has been also standardised and normalised on the British population (Francis, Rajan, & Turner, 
1990; Ryan, 2007). 
The BSI subscales scored for the purpose of this study were: psychoticism, paranoid 
ideation, depression, and anxiety. The severity of experiences of psychosis was measured with 
the subscales of psychoticism and paranoid ideation. Derogatis and Melisaratos (1983) 
described the subscale of psychoticism as representing a continuum progressing from a mild 
interpersonal alienation to a floridly psychotic state, and consisting of the first-rank symptoms 
of schizophrenia, including experiences of thought control. The paranoid ideation subscale 
represented a paranoid mode of thinking consisting of thoughts of projection, hostility, 
suspicion, centrality, and fear of loss of autonomy (Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983). The content 
of both subscales combined appeared consistent with the clinical criteria for the diagnosis of 
paranoid schizophrenia, as summarised earlier in the article. Therefore, combined scores from 
both subscales were used to measure the individual levels of experiences of psychosis. The BSI 
subscales of depression and anxiety were scored to measure emotional distress arising from 
experiences of psychosis, which also formed the psychological distress facets of the four-
dimension model. 
 
2.2.2 Affect balance scale (ABS) 
The ABS is a 10-item rating scale containing Positive Affect Scale (PAS, five statements 
reflecting positive feelings) and Negative Affect Scale (NAS, five statements reflecting negative 
feelings). The statements are presented in a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ format. PAS questions receive a rating 
of 1 for ‘yes’ and 0 for ‘no’, whereas NAS ratings are reversed. The affect balance score is 
computed by subtracting negative affect scores from positive affect scores and adding a 
constant of 5 to avoid negative scores. The whole set of ten questions can be administered in 
less than 5 minutes (Bradburn, 1969). For the purpose of this research only the PAS scores were 
used. 
The ABS was demonstrated to have good internal reliability: alpha coefficient was reported 
to be 0.72 by Devins, Beiser, Dion, Pelletier, and Edwards (1997), and 0.74 by Godoy-Izquierdo, 
Martinez, and Godoy (2008). Test-retest reliability of the ABS was established as 0.76 (Ryff, 
1989). Factorial invariance resulted with the following outcomes: adjusted goodness-of-fit value 
was 0.98, and its Bentler and Bonett Index estimated as 0.91 (Devins et al., 1997). The ABS was 
also reported to show a convergent validity with other measures of related constructs, such as 
Depression-Happiness Scale (Lewis, McCollam, & Joseph, 2000). The following psychometric 
properties were described for the PAS: test-retest reliability was established as 0.83 (Ryff, 1989), 
Cronbach alpha coefficient was found to be 0.82 (Godoy-Izquierdo et al., 2008), and convergent 
validity with other single-item indicators of happiness ranged from 0.34 to 0.38 (Lewis et al., 
2000). 
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2.2.3 Satisfaction with life scale (SWLS) 
The SWLS contains five items rated on a 7-point scale, from ‚strongly disagree‛ to ‚strongly 
agree‛, reflecting individual appraisals of subjective wellbeing. Total scores fall into one of the 
levels of satisfaction, from ‚extremely dissatisfied‛ to ‚extremely satisfied‛ (Peterson, 2006). 
Normative data for the SWLS have been established on a diverse and cross-cultural 
population, including psychiatric inpatients, psychotherapy clients, prisoners, persons 
suffering from physical disabilities, older adults, and students. The SWLS demonstrated strong 
internal reliability and temporal stability: coefficient alpha for the scale was 0.87, and a 2-month 
stability coefficient was established as 0.82 (Diener et al., 1985). Over longer time periods, the 
test-retest reliability decreased to a level of 0.54, which demonstrated that the SWLS had a 
temporal stability property (for up to four years), while it has also been shown to hold 
sufficient sensitivity to detect change in life satisfaction during, for example, a course of 
intervention (Pavot & Diener, 1993). The SWLS was also reported to demonstrate satisfactory 
validity. The loading of Compton’s happiness factor has been established to be as high as 0.83 
and item-total correlations were reported to range between 0.57 and 0.75 (Argyle, 2001). As 
presented by Pavot and Diener (1993), correlation of SWLS with other self-report and non self-
report measures of subjective wellbeing and satisfaction was found to range from 0.28 
(informant reports) to 0.68 (e.g. Andrews/Withey Scale). 
 
2.3 Procedure 
The recruitment to the current study and assessments were carried out by practising clinical 
psychologists amongst the clients with whom they had an established therapeutic relationship 
and working alliance. Clinical psychologists determined whether a particular client within their 
caseloads met the inclusion criteria for the research. Potential participants were given leaflets 
containing information about the study project. Those who agreed to take part were then asked 
to sign a consent form and complete the questionnaires. The measures were administered to the 
participants by their psychologists in a fixed order: BSI, PAS and SWLS. Completion of the full 
assessment set took approximately 15-20 minutes. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Stage 1: Replication of the four-dimension model 
The levels of depression and anxiety were demonstrated to correlate positively (r = 0.667, sig < 
0.001) with each other. Satisfaction with life was shown to be positively correlated with 
positive affect (r = 0.418, sig = 0.003) and inversely correlated with depression (r = -0.473, sig < 
0.001) and anxiety (r = -0.394, sig = 0.003). Positive affect was also demonstrated to inversely 
correlate with depression (r = -0.274, sig = 0.031) and with anxiety (r = -0.169, sig = 0.129). The 
latter correlation was low and statistically non-significant. This finding seemed understandable 
in the light of previous research which demonstrated that it was not uncommon for an 
individual to be both anxious and joyful (Headey & Wearing, 1992). 
The findings supported our initial prediction (Hypothesis 1). The correlational patterns of 
the four-dimension model of SWB and psychological distress established for the general 
population were replicated with people experiencing psychosis. Pearson r correlation 
coefficients and their significance levels for the replicated four-dimension model are shown in 
Table 1 (below). 
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Table 1. Pearson 1-tailed r correlation coefficients and their significance levels between the 
four dimensions of SWB and psychological distress model within the studied sample 
Four dimensions of 
SWB & psychological 
distress 
 
Depression 
 
Anxiety 
 
Positive affect 
Life   
satisfaction 
Depression 
--- 
r = 0.667 
sig < 0.001 
r = -0.274 
sig = 0.031 
r = -0.473 
sig < 0.001 
Anxiety r = 0.669 
sig < 0.001 
--- 
r = -0.169 
sig = 0.129 
r = -0.394 
sig = 0.003 
Positive affect r = -0.274 
sig = 0.031 
r = - 0.169 
sig = 0.129 
--- 
r = 0.418 
sig = 0.003 
Life satisfaction r = -0.473 
sig < 0.001 
r = -0.394 
sig = 0.003 
r = 0.418 
sig = 0.003 
--- 
 
3.2 Stage 2: Psychosis and four dimensions of SWB and psychological distress 
As shown in Table 2, the levels of psychoticism and paranoid ideation were shown to be 
strongly positively correlated with the dimensions of depression (r = 0.716, sig < 0.001) and 
anxiety (r = 0.721, sig < 0.001) within the four-dimension model (Hypothesis 2). The intensity of 
psychoticism and paranoid ideation was demonstrated to be reversely correlated with the 
dimension of life satisfaction (-0.349, sig = 0.008), and was found to show a reversed correlation 
with positive affect (Hypothesis 3), though statistically non-significant (r = -0.219, sig = 0.069). 
 
Table 2. Pearson 1-tailed r correlation coefficients and their significance levels between the 
self-reported severity of psychosis and the four dimensions of SWB and psychological 
distress 
Study model 
dimensions 
Depression Anxiety Positive affect Life satisfaction 
Psychoticism & 
paranoid ideation 
0.716 
sig < 0.001 
0.721 
sig < 0.001 
-0.219 
sig = 0.069 
-0.349 
sig = 0.008 
 
Table 3 (below) presents descriptive sample statistics and general population norms for the 
study model dimensions. As predicted (Hypothesis 4), the average levels of depression and 
anxiety in the studied sample were both increased by at least 1 SD in comparison with the 
community norms. Given the correlational patterns reported in stage 1, the finding appears 
consistent with the study model, since the sample levels of psychoticism were increased by 
approximately 2 SD and the levels of paranoid ideation were heightened by approximately 1.5 
SD from the norms. 
Our sample mean for the positive affect dimension was similar to the British general 
population mean. Hence, contrary to our prediction (Hypothesis 5), the participants exhibited 
levels of positive affect close to the British average. However, the sample mean score on SWLS 
was placed within the ‘slightly dissatisfied’ range of scores. In comparison, normative data 
described by Diener et al. (1985) reported that the non-clinical population mean falls within the 
‘slightly satisfied’ score range. Consequently, our sample’s satisfaction with life was reduced 
by approximately 1 SD in comparison with the general population trend. This result supported 
our prediction (Hypothesis 6). 
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Table 3. Descriptive sample statistics and normative data for the study model dimensions 
Study model dimensions  Mean Standard deviation 
Psychoticism 
sample statistics 1.57 0.93 
BSI norms* 0.27 0.48 
Paranoid ideation 
sample statistics 1.48 1.04 
BSI norms* 0.54 0.65 
Depression 
sample statistics 1.58 1.04 
BSI norms* 0.42 0.65 
Anxiety 
sample statistics 1.48 0.99 
BSI norms* 0.45 0.60 
Positive affect 
sample statistics 2.96 1.73 
ABS norms** 2.84 Not reported 
Life satisfaction 
sample statistics 16.40 7.11 
SWLS norms*** 23.50 6.43 
Note: (*) British non-patient norms reported by Francis et al. (1990). 
(**) British non-clinical norms reported by Basabe et al. (2000). 
(***) Non-clinical norms reported by Diener et al. (1985). 
 
3.3. Stage 3: Mediating role of psychological distress 
A variable is assumed to mediate the relationship between a predictor and an outcome variable 
if the predictor first has an effect on the mediator, which in turn influences the outcome 
variable (Miles & Shevlin, 2001). In other words, a mediated relationship between variables 
occurs if a predictor has its effect on the outcome variable via another variable, the mediator. 
The starting point to construct a mediational model is a theoretically informed possibility that a 
mediator variable occurs ‘between’ the studied predictor and outcome variables (Bennett, 
2000). As suggested by Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004), decisions about potential mediators are 
based on previous research and existing theories, and are best made a priori in the design stage 
rather than post hoc. In the present study, mediators were identified on theoretical grounds and 
the development of the proposed mediational model (see Figure 2 below) was informed by 
previous research discussed in earlier paragraphs.  
As argued by MacKinnon, Fairchild and Fritz (2007), mediating processes often include 
multiple mediators, which are likely to provide a more accurate estimation of mediation effects 
in a variety of research contexts. Subsequently, mediation models which consist of more than 
one mediator are straightforward extensions of the single-mediator models. Derived from the 
hypothesised mediational pathways, Figure 3 (below) depicts three mediational sub-models, 
which were investigated separately in order to establish mediating properties for each of the 
proposed mediators. 
The mediational sub-models assume three-variable systems in which the following causal 
associations occur: a representing the relation of the predictor variable to the mediator, b 
representing the relation of the mediator to the outcome variable adjusted for the predictor 
variable, and c’ representing the indirect-only relation of the predictor variable to the outcome 
variable adjusted for the mediator. 
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Figure 2. Hypothesised mediational pathways between the severity of psychoticism and 
paranoid ideation and the levels of life satisfaction (with the demonstrated correlational 
directions) 
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Figure 3. Mediational sub-models: depression, anxiety and positive affect as hypothesised 
mediators in the association between psychoticism and paranoid ideation (predictor 
variable) and satisfaction with life (outcome variable) 
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3.3.1 Causal steps in mediation analysis 
The causal steps approach to mediation analysis (Bennett, 2000; MacKinnon, et al., 2007; Miles 
& Shevlin, 2001) was employed. In order to establish mediating properties of the hypothesised 
mediators, the stepped analysis needs to consist of the following four stages: (1) the predictor 
variable must be shown to significantly relate to the outcome variable using regression, (2) the 
predictor variable must be demonstrated to significantly relate to the mediating variable using 
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regression, (3) using multiple regression, the mediator must be shown to be significantly 
related to the outcome variable while the predictor variable remains controlled, and (4) when 
controlling for the mediator, the coefficient relating the predictor variable to the outcome 
variable must be smaller (in absolute value) than the coefficient calculated in step 1, or the 
relationship between the predictor and the outcome variable must be less significant than in 
step 1. When in step 4 the relationship between the predictor variable and the outcome variable 
is smaller than in step 1 (but still greater than zero) and the coefficient is statistically significant, 
then the data suggest partial mediation. If, when controlling for the mediator, the effect of the 
predictor variable on the outcome variable is zero, or the relationship is at least no longer 
statistically significant, then the data are consistent with a dominant mediation model. 
 
3.3.2 Outcomes of mediation analyses 
Table 4 summarises results of mediation analyses with depression, anxiety and positive affect 
as mediating variables. In step 1, psychoticism and paranoid ideation were shown to be 
significantly inversely related to life satisfaction: B = -1.431, sig = 0.016. Coefficient B suggested 
that with a single unit increase in psychoticism and paranoid ideation, an individual’s 
satisfaction with life decreased by approximately one and a half units. Furthermore, based on R 
square value, psychoticism and paranoid ideation were estimated to account for 12.2% of 
variance in the levels of life satisfaction. Given that the predictor and outcome variables 
remained the same, the results of causal step 1 applied to each of the mediational sub-models. 
 
Table 4. Results of mediation analyses 
Causal steps R square Coefficient B  B significance 
Step 1 0.122 - 1.431 0.016 
Mediation analysis 1:      PPI*                     Depression                 SWL** 
Step 2 (path a1) 0.513 0.432 < 0.001 
Step 3 (path b1) 0.224 - 3.123 0.020 
Step 4 (path c’1) - - 0.082 0.917 
Mediation analysis 2:       PPI                        Anxiety                      SWL 
Step 2 (path a2) 0.519 0.412 < 0.001 
Step 3 (path b2) 0.164 - 2.130 0.143 
Mediation analysis 3:       PPI                    Positive affect                SWL 
Step 2 (path a3) 0.048 - 0.219 0.139 
Note: (*) Psychoticism and paranoid ideation. (**) Satisfaction with life. 
 
In step 2 of analysis 1, psychoticism and paranoid ideation were demonstrated to be 
significantly related to depression, the mediating variable: B = 0.432, sig < 0.001. With a single 
unit change in predictor variable, the depression levels increased by approximately a half of a 
unit. Also, psychoticism and paranoid ideation were shown to account for 51.3% of variance in 
depression levels. In step 3, when controlling for the predictor variable, depression was 
demonstrated to be significantly related to life satisfaction (path b1 in Figure 3): B = -3.123, sig = 
0.020. The value for Coefficient B suggested that when psychoticism and paranoid ideation is 
controlled, with a single unit change in depression, an individual’s life satisfaction decreased 
by more than three units. Furthermore, when controlling for the predictor variable, depression 
was shown to account for 22.4% of variance in life satisfaction. In step 4, when controlling for 
the mediator, the predictor variable’s association with the outcome variable (path c’1 in Figure 
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3) was shown to be close to zero and statistically non-significant: B = -0.082, sig = 0.917. Thus, 
the results suggested that when controlling for depression, the change in life satisfaction 
associated with a single unit change in psychoticism and paranoid ideation was close to zero 
and, in addition, was statistically non-significant. According to the methodology described by 
Miles and Shevlin (2001), the amount of mediation was estimated by calculating the difference 
between the absolute values of coefficients in steps 1 and 4. The amount of mediation was 
therefore 1.349, which accounted for 94.26% of the initial B coefficient. 
Consequently, the data obtained from mediation analysis 1 were consistent with a 
dominant mediational model suggesting that depression acts as a dominant mediator in the 
relationship between psychoticism and paranoid ideation (predictor variable) and satisfaction 
with life (outcome variable). Hence, the outcomes appeared to partially support our 
hypothesis. Yet, if the dominant mediating role of depression were to be supported with 
further evidence, then both anxiety and positive affect would be shown as statistically non-
significant mediators in the current study model. 
In step 2 of analysis 2, the predictor was demonstrated to significantly relate to anxiety: B = 
0.412, sig < 0.001. The coefficient B value suggested that with a single unit change in 
psychoticism and paranoid ideation, the anxiety levels of an individual increased by almost a 
half of a unit. Moreover, psychoticism and paranoid ideation were shown to account for 51.9% 
of variance in anxiety levels. However, in step 3, when controlling for the predictor, the 
relationship between anxiety and life satisfaction was no longer significant: sig = 0.143. 
Consequently, the data suggested that anxiety was not a statistically significant mediator of the 
relationship between the predictor and outcome variables, and the analysis did not proceed to 
step 4. 
In step 2 of analysis 3, psychoticism and paranoid ideation were shown not to act as a 
significant predictor of positive affect: sig = 0.139. Again, the data suggested that positive affect 
was not a statistically significant mediator. Consequently, steps 3 and 4 of the analysis were not 
undertaken. 
 
3.3.3 Effect size and statistical power 
As suggested by MacKinnon et al. (2007), standardised regression coefficients served as effect 
size measures for individual relations in mediation analyses. Table 5 presents standardised 
coefficients Beta for steps 1 to 4 of mediation analyses in the present study (significance levels 
correspond to those reported for B coefficients). Statistical power (1-β error prob.) of the 
multiple regression stages of the analyses was computed using G*Power software (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) and was established as 0.948 for mediation analysis 1, and 
0.782 for mediation analysis 2. 
 
Table 5. Standardised coefficients Beta for steps 1 to 4 of mediation analyses in the present 
study 
 Mediation 
analysis 1 
Mediation 
analysis 2 
Mediation 
analysis 3 
Coefficient Beta for step 1 - 0.349 - 0.349 - 0.349 
Coefficient Beta for step 2 0.716 0.721 - 0.219 
Coefficient Beta for step 3 - 0.459 - 0.297 --- 
Coefficient Beta for step 4 - 0.020 --- --- 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Psychosis does not equal unhappiness 
Campbell (2007) reported a number of studies describing how people with experiences of 
psychosis felt trapped within a negative professional framework, which in their opinion 
encouraged the dismissal of significant positive aspects of their experience, and appeared 
stigmatising and discriminatory. In our investigation, we attempted to pursue a positive 
psychology approach to studying SWB in psychosis, and to extend the focus of applied positive 
psychology research onto individuals with severe mental health difficulties. 
We tested the suppositions of the four-dimension model of SWB and psychological distress 
amongst people diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. The results supported most of the 
stated hypotheses and indicated that the model could be successfully utilised to gain some 
understanding of SWB levels amongst individuals with experiences of psychosis. Since the 
correlations between the dimensions of life satisfaction, positive affect, depression and anxiety 
were exceptionally similar to those reported by Headey and Wearing (1992), it might be 
concluded that the four-dimension model of SWB and psychological distress applies not only to 
individuals from a non-clinical population, but also to people with complex, severe and 
enduring mental health difficulties, such as psychosis. This finding seems rather important, 
since it indicates that the levels of SWB amongst people diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia, arguably the most severe form of psychosis, appear largely similar to the levels 
demonstrated within the general population. Moreover, a range of the sample scores on the 
dimensions of positive affect and life satisfaction indicated that individuals experiencing 
psychosis might even feel very joyful and extremely satisfied with their lives. Hence, contrary 
to the traditional deficit-oriented and misery-focused portrayal of psychosis, we can now 
present data to support the argument that in some instances individuals with experiences of 
psychosis can report levels of SWB that are similar to those identified within the general 
population.  
 
4.2 Psychosis does not immobilize adaptive mechanisms of SWB 
Compared with a trend in the non-clinical population to be slightly satisfied with life, 
participants in our study appeared on average slightly dissatisfied with their lives. Given the 
study model, we proposed that it was the emotional distress accompanying experiences of 
psychosis that accounted for this dissatisfaction, rather than the objective presence or absence 
of symptoms clustered in the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. The elevated levels of 
psychoticism and paranoid ideation clearly correlated with depression and anxiety dimensions 
within the model, and resulted in heightened levels of both dimensions in comparison to the 
general population norms. Consequently, increased levels of psychological distress were 
accompanied by reduced satisfaction with life amongst individuals experiencing psychosis. 
Interestingly, levels of positive affect in our sample were similar to those reported in the 
general population. We propose that because of those levels of positive affect (despite clearly 
elevated experiences of depression and anxiety), the average satisfaction with life reported in 
the sample was only slightly lowered in comparison with general population trends. The most 
immediate explanation of this surprising finding might be located within the four-dimension 
model itself, which originally suggested that positive and negative affect are separate and only 
moderately correlated entities (Headey & Wearing, 1992). 
Further explanation of our finding can be based on a dynamic equilibrium theory of 
happiness developed by Headey (2006). In their Australian general population study, Headey 
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and Wearing (1992) demonstrated that the majority of people, regardless of their socio-
economic status, feel fairly happy with their lives. The authors proposed that every individual 
in any stable life situation, that is in the absence of major life changes, arrives at an equilibrium 
state in which their situation is viewed as being almost as satisfying as the life a person expects. 
In an equilibrium state, the present circumstances are regarded as considerably better than the 
worst previous period in a person’s life. Consequently, a state of equilibrium that consists of 
high average levels of happiness appears to be associated with a set of idiosyncratic 
perceptions, aspirations and expectancies. As suggested by Headey and Wearing (1991), 
‚human beings construct their world to arrive at a psychologically consistent set of perceptions 
– an equilibrium state – which supports or bolsters a feeling of wellbeing‛ (p. 8). 
In the dynamic equilibrium theory, Headey (2006) proposed that both positive and negative 
major life events, such as winning a large sum in a lottery or becoming seriously ill, are 
typically habituated to and people return to their usual, individually-set equilibrium states of 
happiness. Thus, on most occasions after major negative life events initially increase levels of 
psychological distress and decrease levels of positive affect, these return to their idiosyncratic 
base levels and the equilibrium in individual SWB is reinstated. Therefore, it appears that in the 
present study individuals diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia were able to adapt to even 
such disconcerting and unsettling experiences as onset of psychosis, acute episodes of paranoia 
and hearing voices, or admissions to inpatient wards, and return to their individual 
equilibrium states.  
 
4.3 Psychosis does not exempt individuals from positive mood set-points 
In their positive mood set-point theory, Diener and Diener (1996) proposed that there is a 
positive, rather than neutral, baseline for affect in human beings, which has significant 
adaptive, evolutionary, motivational, social, learning and intrinsic functions. For instance, 
positive moods give negative events maximum informational value and therefore such events 
can be easily noticed and quickly attended to. Also, it is pertinent for motivational reasons that 
people are not in a negative mood most of the time. Positive moods energise approach 
tendencies, which must prevail in human behaviour in order to obtain food, shelter, social 
contact, sex and so forth. Although the exact set-point varies amongst individuals depending 
on a person’s socialisation and temperament, for most people it remains in the positive range 
(Diener & Diener, 1996). 
Since the general levels of positive affect in our sample were demonstrated to be similar to 
those reported in the general population, we propose that the experiences of psychosis do not 
automatically disturb positive mood set-points of individuals diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia. 
 
4.4 Psychosis does not indiscriminately reduce satisfaction with life 
The results of our mediation analyses were consistent with a dominant mediational model and 
demonstrated that depression acted as a dominant mediator in the relationship between 
psychoticism and paranoid ideation (predictor) and satisfaction with life (outcome). The data 
supported the indirect-only XMY mediation type (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010), in which an 
increase in the levels of psychoticism and paranoid ideation (X) would reduce satisfaction with 
life (Y) only if accompanied by increased depression levels (M). Thus, the results suggested that 
experiences of psychosis might indirectly affect individual life satisfaction through their 
influence on depression levels. 
Subjective wellbeing in psychosis 
Mankiewicz, Gresswell, & Turner 
 
www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 50 
Consequently, the hypothesised mediational model was partially supported by the results, 
as considering the correlational patterns between the studied model dimensions we expected 
anxiety and positive affect to act as partial mediators as well. However, given the weak and 
statistically non-significant correlation between psychoticism/paranoid ideation and positive 
affect, it appears understandable that the latter did not have any significant mediating 
properties. Furthermore, this finding seems consistent with one of the underlying suppositions 
of the four-dimension model of happiness and psychological distress, in which positive and 
negative affect are separate and only moderately correlated entities that coexist with each other. 
Given the size and significance levels of anxiety correlation coefficients with both predictor 
and outcome variables, the results of analysis 2, which suggested no significant mediational 
properties of anxiety, were more surprising. However, again, the possible explanation for this 
finding appears to be placed within the empirical foundations of the four-dimension model 
reported by Headey and Wearing (1992). The authors argued that although depression and 
anxiety were both major influences on SWB through their inverse effect on a sense of 
satisfaction, and on frequency of positive emotions, the two main forms of psychological 
distress were at least partly independent, and while individuals could be satisfied with their 
lives and anxious, it was very rare to find people who were both satisfied and depressed. 
Also, the findings appear to remain in agreement with a cognitive model of depression, in 
which negative and self-defeating cognitions are unconditional and over-generalised and 
subsequently affect individual perception of one’s whole life (Sanders & Wills, 2005). This does 
not seem to leave much space for positive and joyful experiences. Additionally, as argued by 
Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1997, 2002), heightened levels of anxiety might precipitate and even 
accompany the experiences of enjoyment. Hence, there is a low and statistically non-significant 
reversed correlation between anxiety and positive affect. 
 
5. Study limitations 
5.1 Ambiguous implications for the practice of positive clinical psychology 
Given the results of the current study, it seems plausible to suggest that in order to enhance 
satisfaction with life of a person with experiences of psychosis, psychological interventions 
would need to focus primarily on reducing symptoms of depression. And traditional clinical 
psychology that emphasises the alleviation of emotional distress offers exactly such 
interventions: psychological therapies for depression (e.g. Barkham & Parry, 2008). Yet, applied 
positive psychology may propose an alternative approach that complements the traditional 
deficit-based stance. 
Positive clinical psychology practice offers a range of strengths-based interventions that 
focus on amplifying an individual’s experiences of joy and on increasing a person’s satisfaction 
with life. Joseph and Linley (2006) argued that positive clinical psychologists identify human 
strengths and promote mental health as assets which buffer against mental illness through 
educational, relational and social interventions. The four-dimension model seems to depict 
clearly how the enhanced levels of joy and life satisfaction may operate as buffers against 
psychological distress. However, the model does not appear to suggest what exactly might be 
done in order to increase an individual’s SWB from the positive psychology perspective. 
Neither does the dynamic equilibrium theory. Indeed, the model seems to imply that the levels 
of both depression and anxiety ought to be reduced to increase a person’s happiness, which is 
rather consistent with the traditional clinical psychology stance. The dynamic equilibrium 
theory, on the other hand, suggests that if left on their own individuals would sooner or later 
return to their equilibrium levels of SWB. These theoretical inconsistencies with the applied 
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positive psychology approach seem to make the potential clinical implications of the present 
study rather ambiguous. 
Yet, some guidance for psychological interventions from the perspective of positive clinical 
psychology can be found in the theory of flow developed by Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1997, 
2002). The theory proposed that SWB can be enhanced through engagement with everyday life 
and through involvement in absorbing tasks, such as work or leisure activities, in which a 
person exercises individual strengths, talents and interests. The involvement and absorption in 
activities that individuals do for their own sake lead to unique harmony and order in 
consciousness. Such optimal experiences help an individual to develop and cultivate an 
optimistic perception of oneself and the future. These theoretical propositions informed the 
practical recommendations that Carr (2005) gave to mental health professionals aspiring to 
pursue a positive psychology approach in their clinical practice. For instance, the author 
suggested that ‚clinicians may help clients identify their talents and explore ways to use these 
frequently to generate flow experiences‛ (p. 5). Given the crucial role that activities, hobbies 
and work might play in the recovery of people with severe mental health difficulties (Bryson et 
al., 2002; Davies, Hopkins, Campisi, & Maggs, 2012), the practical recommendations derived 
from the theory of flow appear consistent with the needs of individuals experiencing psychosis. 
 
5.2 Unexamined aetiology of psychological distress in psychosis 
The study did not investigate why individuals with psychosis often react with heightened 
levels of psychological distress. As already discussed, throughout the last two decades the 
subject of emotional distress in psychosis has been thoroughly investigated by cognitive 
psychology researchers. Hence, for conceptual purposes, we have taken a cognitive perspective 
on this matter. Cognitive models of psychosis propose that it is not a delusional or 
hallucinatory experience in itself that accounts for emotional distress of an individual 
experiencing psychosis. It is rather the individual’s appraisal or interpretation of that 
experience that triggers a particular emotional reaction (Chadwick, Birchwood, & Trower, 
1996). Perhaps, the clearest cognitive framework for experiences such as delusions or 
hallucinations has been based on Ellis’ A-B-C model, where A stands for ‘activating event’, B 
stands for ‘belief’ about activating event, and C stands for ‘consequences’ of holding a 
particular belief, including emotional, behavioural and physiological reactions (Dudley & 
Kuyken, 2006). Within the A-B-C framework, hallucinations are the activating events (As), 
which are interpreted and appraised by an individual (Bs). These interpretations might be 
delusional or paranoid in their content, and subsequently trigger associated emotional 
reactions (Cs), such as anxiety or depression (Chadwick et al., 1996). For instance, when a 
person experiences a threatening auditory hallucination, s/he might think s/he has lost control 
over her/his life and deserves punishment and, as the result of this belief, becomes depressed. 
Consequently, given the four-dimension model of SWB and psychological distress, the person’s 
levels of joy and life satisfaction would be negatively affected.  
 
5.3 Unexplored external indicators of general wellbeing 
The study focused entirely on the subjective aspects of wellbeing. Thus, objective indicators 
were not considered within the studied model. There has been an ongoing debate about the 
relevance of external factors for SWB that continues to take place in the positive psychology 
literature. As explained by Argyle (2001), the major weakness of objective indicators is that we 
do not yet know which to investigate uniformly, as different people might have radically 
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different hierarchies of values. Hence, indiscriminate inclusion of a set cluster of external 
influences might pose a risk of distorting results of nomothetic quantitative studies.  
Veenhoven (1991) argued that SWB relates more strongly to psychological variables than to 
socio-economic indicators, whilst Argyle and Martin (1991) concluded that the effect of 
objective indicators on subjective satisfaction was statistically non-significant. For instance, a 
number of studies reported that a vast majority (up to 96%) of unmarried, unemployed and 
relatively uneducated people reported being satisfied with their lives (Diener & Diener, 1996). 
Also, as Western societies got richer during the last five decades, their people have not become 
any happier, yet at the same time average income has more than doubled (Layard, 2005). 
Furthermore, Haidt (2006) reviewed the existing empirical studies and concluded that there 
was no evidence suggesting that personal or occupational success increases overall SWB. 
Almost zero association was found between having children and happiness (Powdthavee, 
2009). 
Schwarz and Strack (1991) reported that most objective life circumstances account for less 
than 5% of the variance in measures of SWB and the combination of a dozen objective domains 
of life accounts for less that 10%. Thus, the assumption of general external laws affecting one’s 
happiness appears to have turned out unfruitful, as the evidence suggests that levels of SWB 
draw on inner sources rather than on outer ones (Schimmack & Lucas, 2007). It seems that, 
unless the basic life needs are jeopardized, people from all socio-economic and ethnic groups 
report their satisfaction well above neutral (Diener & Lucas, 2000). As noticed by Peterson and 
Park (2009), ‚most people rate themselves as somewhat above the midpoint of a happiness 
scale, whether they are multimillionaires in the United States< or homeless prostitutes in 
Calcutta<‛ (p. 304). Hence, the four-dimension model’s focus on internal emotional processes 
might be seen as both its limitation and its strength. 
 
5.4 Convenience sampling and selective participation 
Non-probability convenience sampling was adopted for the purpose of this study. Due to the 
limited number of potential participants and predicted difficulties with engaging individuals 
with active psychosis (as described by Evans-Jones, Peters and Barker, 2009), the study needed 
to be conducted with those accessible and agreeing to participate. As argued by Leary (2004), 
non-probability samples are entirely acceptable for psychological research, since the goal is 
typically not to describe how the population behaves but rather test some specific hypotheses 
regarding relations between variables in a particular sample. ‚We may wonder whether the 
results generalise to other kinds of samples, but this question does not undermine the quality of 
particular study‛ (p. 126).  
As suggested by Gassie (1968), research findings might be generalised from one situation to 
another if the study sample is representative of both situations. Hence, how representative our 
sample has been of people with psychosis in general and how might it differ from individuals 
who experience psychosis but remain outside of specialist care? The response rate in our study 
appeared at least satisfactory: the majority of the individuals who received the research 
information sheet expressed their interest in contributing to the exploration of SWB levels in 
psychosis and agreed to fill in the questionnaires. Our participants were recruited from a range 
of specialist care settings: acute care wards, rehabilitation wards and outpatient community-
based clinics. Therefore, a range of stages of recovery from acute psychotic episodes was 
included. Furthermore, relatively high standard deviations of the psychoticism and paranoid 
ideation scales indicated that the range of current levels of psychosis varied considerably 
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within the sample, which indicated that severity of psychosis was indeed fairly well 
represented: from an acute to a relative recuperation stage. 
The study was not conducted in early intervention services. Hence, individuals with first 
episodes of psychosis, or those at risk of developing psychosis, were not included. Neither 
were persons who were in remission from psychotic experiences and consequently did not 
require a psychological intervention, or those who never searched for specialist care. Thus, 
while generalising the present research outcomes, the specificity of the studied sample (i.e. 
individuals with present psychosis across the range of recovery stages in receipt of specialist 
care) needs to be taken into consideration. 
 
5.5 Limitations of mediation analysis 
The stepped approach to mediation analysis may appear to imply that if the statistical 
assumptions of causal steps were met and a series of regressions were conducted, then a 
definite answer about mediating effects would be provided. Bramwell (1996) argued that since 
mediation analysis relies on purely correlational techniques, rather than on experimental 
manipulation of cause and effect, it cannot provide any conclusive evidence that the direction 
of causality is that which a researcher predicts. Similarly, Bryman and Cramer (2001) proposed 
that a correlational study cannot establish the causal effects and the generation of causal 
explanations from correlational research can be meaningless; these effects can only be inferred. 
Since causal inferences generally cannot be made on the basis of non-experimental studies, then 
correlational data must rather be interpreted merely in correlational terms and the only 
conclusion that can be made is that the causal model is consistent with the data. Again, as 
suggested by Bryman and Cramer (2001), in order to make inferences about the likely direction 
of cause and effect, ‚the researcher must look to probable directions of causation... or to 
theories which suggest that certain variables are more likely to precede others‛ (p. 229). In 
addition, Kenny (2008) argued that, given the causal assumption that underlies a mediational 
analysis, if the study model is misspecified, then the mediation analysis’ results are not so 
much meaningless as misleading. Therefore, it is of major importance for any researcher to 
justify the assumptions that have been made in any mediational model. 
In the present study, the justification for causational directions in mediational models was 
established on the grounds of previous research conducted on the subjects of emotional distress 
in psychosis and cognitive and affective components of SWB. It is argued here that the indirect-
only causational model with depression as the dominant mediator was consistent with the 
obtained data. However, it is also acknowledged that the findings presented should be 
interpreted in correlational terms; a definite proof for the direction of causality should not be 
inferred. 
Yet, Kenny (2008) strongly disagreed with the idea that experimental studies are the only 
legitimate design for drawing causal conclusions. The author argued that the experimental 
requirement for manipulation prevents studying many variables of which manipulation would 
be unethical. Additionally, if the mediators are internal psychological properties or processes 
then these variables can only be measured, not manipulated. ‚If we can only study variables 
that we manipulate, we have a science that artificially limits itself from studying as causes 
variables that cannot be manipulated‛ (Kenny, 2008, p. 356). Kenny’s conclusions appeared 
pertinent in the context of the present research. Given the subject studied, the idea of 
constructing an experiment in which the investigated variables were experimentally 
manipulated appeared highly unethical, if at all possible. 
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6. Future directions 
When interpreting the results of mediational analysis, the issue of an alternative equivalent 
model must be acknowledged. That is, for any given mediational model there are likely to be 
alternative models with different patterns of relations amongst the studied variables that are 
consistent with the data (Frazier et al., 2004). As noticed by MacKinnon et al. (2007, p. 595),  
although the consideration of a third variable may appear simple, three-variable 
systems can be very complicated, and there are many alternative explanations of 
observed relations other that mediation. 
The four-dimension model of SWB and psychological distress chosen for the purpose of the 
present study, although supported with evidence, is only one of a number of happiness 
concepts. Successful replication of the model with the studied sample and its employment for 
the purpose of the proposed mediational pathways was only an initial attempt to investigate 
SWB amongst individuals with complex and enduring mental health difficulties. 
It is important to remember that although the dominant mediational properties of 
depression were consistent with the obtained data, psychoticism and paranoid ideation 
accounted only for 12.2% of variance in the levels of satisfaction with life amongst the study 
participants. Also, when controlling for the predictor variable, depression accounted for 22.4% 
of variance in life satisfaction. Thus, it appears essential that future studies focus on 
establishing the other determinants of satisfaction with life amongst individuals experiencing 
psychosis. For instance, the mentioned theory of flow may serve as an alternative equivalent 
model and provide some indications for additional personal determinants of life satisfaction 
amongst individuals with severe psychological difficulties (e.g. an ability to become engaged in 
and absorbed with activities), which might inform the focus of future research. 
Furthermore, as proposed by Forgeard, Jayawickreme, Kern, and Seligman (2011), future 
research on the subject of wellbeing should endeavour to capture the complex and multifaceted 
nature of wellbeing and combine both subjective and objective measures. The authors argued 
that ‚subjective measures are insufficient; objective measures provide essential additional 
information by conveying the circumstances in which individuals live and develop‛ (p. 98). 
This assertion seems particularly relevant to the sample studied, as it is fundamentally 
important to acknowledge the objective disadvantages and widespread stigmatisation that are 
faced by people with psychosis (e.g. Lingwood, 2006; Thornicroft, 2006). Hence it seems 
essential that future research incorporates a holistic approach to the wellbeing of individuals 
with severe mental health difficulties, and that both internal (personal, psychological) and 
external (objective) variables are taken into consideration. 
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